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Foreword 
 
Given the current unsettled economic conditions both globally and in India, this 
paper is extremely topical. With his insider’s view of the macroeconomic situation, 
Professor Acharya, has expectedly provided a number of analytical insights into 
India’s macroeconomic performance since 2000. Both policy makers and 
researchers will find the last section on challenges currently facing the Indian 
economy specially useful. It is my hope that this paper will help focus attention on 
the need for a better coordination of monetary and fiscal policies for managing the 
macroeconomic situation. And at the same focus on current challenges also 
highlights the importance of pressing on with structural reforms. Professor 
Acharya’s working paper has provided the best possible start for future output 
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Abstract 
 
The paper reviews India’s macroeconomic performance and policies since 2000. The 
first section briefly summarizes key macroeconomic developments regarding 
economic growth, inflation, external balance, the fiscal situation and aggregate 
savings and investment. The second section considers some of the challenges posed to 
macroeconomic management in this period and the efficacy of the policy responses 
adopted. In particular, it analyses the progress in fiscal consolidation and the policies 
adopted to deal with the challenge of the unprecedented surge in external capital 
inflows into India. The final section outlines some of the major macro policy issues 
that need to be addressed in the years ahead, including: the resurgence of high fiscal 
deficits; the issues relating to external convertibility and exchange rate management;  
the role of the Reserve Bank of India in macroeconomic policy and coping with a 
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This paper reviews India’s macroeconomic performance and policies after 2000 and 
up through the end the fiscal year 2007/8. Section I provides a brief review of 
macroeconomic developments since 2000. Section II considers some of the challenges 
posed to macroeconomic management in this period and the efficacy of the policy 
responses adopted. The final section outlines some of the major macro policy issues 
that need to be addressed in the years ahead. 
 
I.  Review of Macroeconomic Developments
2  
 
A.  Growth 
 
The pace of economic growth is usually regarded as the primary indicator of a 
country’s macroeconomic health. By this measure India has done very well in this 
decade, especially in the most recent five years, with GDP growth averaging an 
unprecedented 8.8 percent a year over 2003/4-2007/8. The previous best five-year 
period for growth was in 1992/3-1996/7 (at 6.6 percent a year), triggered by the initial 
burst of economic reforms following the balance of payments crisis of 1991 (Table 1). 
That earlier spurt in investment, productivity and growth had faltered after 1996 
because of several factors, including: the headwinds from the East Asian financial 
crisis; the initial uncertainties of coalitional governance; and a sustained deterioration 
in the fiscal deficit caused primarily by the large public pay increases following the 
Fifth Pay Commission.
3 As a consequence, growth had slowed to an average of 5.5 
percent during the Ninth Five Year Plan period, 1997/8-2001/2. It dropped even lower 
to 3.8 percent in 2002/3 because of a sharp, drought-induced fall in agricultural 
output. 
 
Table 1:  Growth of Real GDP 






















6.6  5.5  7.8  3.8 8.5 7.5 9.4 9.6 9.0 
Agriculture  4.8  2.5  2.5  -7.2  10.0  0.0 5.9 3.8 4.5 
Industry  7.3  4.3  9.2  7.1  7.4  10.3 10.1 11.0  8.5 
Services 7.3  7.9  9.3  7.5  8.5  9.1  10.3  11.1  10.8 
Per capita  
GDP 
4.4  3.5  6.1  2.3 6.9 5.8 7.7 8.1 7.5 
 
Source: CSO. 
Note: Industry includes Construction. 
                                                 
1  I am grateful to Shikha Gupta for expert research assistance. 
2 For a detailed account of macroeconomic policies and developments in the 1990s see Acharya 
(2002a). 
3 Some, like Surjit Bhalla, stress other reasons for this slowdown, notably unduly restrictive monetary 
policy in the mid-90s.   2
Since then we have witnessed an extraordinary boom, with the aggregate investment 
rate surging above 37 percent of GDP by 2007/8 and economic growth soaring to 9 
percent or higher in the last three years, 2005/6-2007/8. The proximate drivers of this 
growth spurt included the sustained investment boom, cumulative productivity-
enhancing effects of reforms, an unusually buoyant international economic 
environment and a demand-and- technology driven acceleration of modern services 
output. Inspection of the sectoral composition of growth shows that the Ninth Plan 
slowdown was confined to agriculture and industry; services continued to grow fast 
and even accelerated (Table 1). Moreover, the expansion of services accelerated 
further in the years after 2002/3, propelled by high rates of growth in communications 
(especially telecom), business services (especially information technology) and 
finance.
4 Industry picked up steam from 2002/3 and continued to grow robustly right 
through to 2007/8. Agricultural growth remained variable, substantially dependent on 
weather conditions. The sector has been unusually buoyant in the last three years, 
contributing significantly to the 9 percent plus rate of overall economic growth.  
 
Table 2:  Sectoral Composition of Growth 
 















Agriculture 28.2  19.4    21.1  11.5  7.0 
Industry 26.4  26.5  29.0  20.2  29.3 
Services 45.4  54.1  49.8  68.3  63.6 




The exceptionally rapid growth in India’s services sector is reflected in the 
contribution of this sector to overall economic growth since 1991/92 (Table 2). In the 
five years between 1991/92 and 1996/7 services contributed just about half of total 
growth in GDP.
5 In the subsequent five years to 2001/2 the sector’s contribution rose 
sharply to 68 percent and has remained at a high 64 percent in the six years since 
2001/2. These shares would be even higher if the construction sub-sector were 
included under services instead of industry. Perhaps equally noteworthy but more 
disquieting is the low and declining contribution of agriculture to GDP growth after 
1996/7, even though over half of India’s labour force is still employed in this sector. 
In the six years after 2001/2 agriculture contributed only 7 percent of total growth of 
GDP.  
                                                 
4  The extraordinary growth of India’s services sector at relatively low income levels has been widely 
noted and analysed. See, for example, Gordon and Gupta (2004). Doubts have also been raised about 
the quality of national income estimates in services; see Bosworth, Collins and Virmani (2007) and 
Acharya (2002a, 2007). 
5  In the 1980s the contribution of services to overall economic growth was only 46 percent.   3
Table 3:  Expenditure Composition of Growth 
 

















Investment  (GDCF)  23.9 32.6    29.2 20.4  57.3 
Government Final 
Consumption  11.1 10.2  8.2 16.7  5.3 
Private Final 
Consumption  65.7 59.6  54.3 60.2  47.9 
Net Exports of 
Goods and Services 
(including 
Discrepancies) -0.7  -2.4  8.4 2.7  -10.5 




A glance at the composition of GDP growth from the expenditure side is also 
instructive (Table 3). The increase in aggregate investment expenditure between 
1991/92 and 1996/97 accounted for nearly 30 percent of GDP growth achieved during 
these years and reflected a significant rise in the share of investment in GDP. With the 
investment ratio declining in the next five years the contribution to growth from 
investment demand dropped to just 20 percent. However, what is truly remarkable is 
the surge in investment between 2001/2 and 2007/8, which raised the investment rate 
above 37 percent of GDP by 2007/8 and contributed an extraordinary 57 percent of 
total GDP growth over this period. Conversely, the contributions of government and 
private final consumption expenditure to growth show an opposite pattern, rising in 
the period between 1996/7 and 2001/2 and falling markedly thereafter. 
 
B.  Inflation 
 
If economic growth is the primary indicator of a country’s macroeconomic 
performance, inflation must surely be a close second. Unfortunately, despite 
recommendations of several expert committees, India does not yet have a nation-wide 
consumer price index (CPI). It has three separate CPI indices for different categories 
of workers, of which the one for industrial workers, CPI (IW), is the most commonly 
cited. The wholesale price index (WPI), published every week, is the most widely 
monitored indicator of headline inflation. It suffers from the obvious limitation of 
being confined to commodities in an increasingly services-driven economy. A sub-
index of manufactured products, WPI (MP), is sometimes monitored as a proxy for 
“core” inflation. Against this background the best indicator of inflation over the years 
may be the implicit GDP deflator. However, it is only available for annual and 
quarterly data and that too with considerable lags.  
 
Figure 1 and Table 4 present the basic information on annual inflation trends since 
1991/92. The data support the following broad generalizations. First, and most 
importantly, inflation has been in the “comfort zone” of around 5 percent or less in 
nearly every year since 1998/9. Second, if one focuses on the WPI or five-year   4
averages of any index, inflation has been subdued since 1996/97 (Table 4).
6 Third, in 
the current decade, the GDP deflator has averaged just over 4 percent, with only two 
years in which the rate has crept above 5 percent. Even in 2007/8 and despite the 
global commodity price shock which hit India by the first quarter of 2008, the annual 
rate on inflation reflected in the GDP deflator was only 4.1 percent.
7 
 
Table 4:  Inflation Trends 
(Percent per year) 
 
   WPI (AC)  CPI(IW)  WPI(MP)  GDP 
Deflator 
1992/93-1996/97(average) 8.7 9.3 8.3  9.1 
1997/98-2001/02(average) 4.9 6.3 3.0  5.0 
2002/03-2007/08 (average)  5.0  4.9  4.5  4.4 
2002/03 3.4  4.1  2.6  3.8 
2003/04 5.5  3.7  5.7  3.4 
2004/05 6.5  4.0  6.3  5.5 
2005/06 4.4  4.2  3.1  4.1 
2006/07 5.7  6.8  4.6  5.5 
2007/08 4.6  6.4  4.9  4.1 
 
Sources: Reserve Bank of India: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy and  Bulletins. 
WPI (AC) = Wholesale Price Index (All Commodities) 1993/94=100. 
CPI (IW) = Consumer Price Index (Industrial Workers) For 1992/93-2006/07,  
    1993/94=100. For 2007/08, 2001=100. 
WPI (MP) = Wholesale Price Index (Manufactured Products) 1993/94=100. 
 
Figure 1:  Annual Inflation Rates 
 
                                                 
6 The CPI and GDP deflator spiked upwards in 1998/9 because of a sharp but temporary spurt in 
vegetable prices (especially onion and potatoes) in 1998. 
7 Of course, this does not reflect the “suppressed inflation” associated with non-adjustment of officially 
controlled prices of key petroleum distillates, fertilizers and food grains in the face of sharply rising 
international prices.   5
In a nutshell, inflation was not a significant macro policy problem right up until early 
2008. The factors contributing to this favorable outcome included: low world inflation 
(until 2008) combined with increasingly more liberal Indian foreign trade policies; 
alert and anticipatory monetary policy backed by declining fiscal deficits; and 
downward revision of inflationary expectations in line with actual outcomes. By 
March 2008 these factors had turned sharply adverse.  
 
C.  External Balance 
 
Usually, the current account balance is the single most widely monitored indicator of 
a nation’s external balance position. In India too, the rise of the current account deficit 
to a record 3 percent of GDP in 1990/91 preceded the balance of payments crisis of 
1991. By this measure, India’s external balance position has been comfortable 
throughout the period 2000/01-2007/8, ranging between a high of 2.3 percent of GDP 
in 2003/4 and low of  minus 1.5 percent in 2007/8 (Table 5). Moreover, the relative 
health of current account balance has been concurrent with a marked rise of India’s 
merchandise trade to GDP ratio from 23 percent in 2000/01 to 35 percent in 2007/8, 
as the country continued to deepen its integration with world economy and, more 
recently, rising oil prices bloated the import bill. While this basic assessment is 
correct, the absence of stress in the current account balance masks some important 
new trends in the balance of payments. 
 
Table 5:  Balance of Payments Indicators 



















Merchandise                
Exports 9.9 9.4 10.6 11.1 12.2 13.0  14.0  13.5
Imports 12.6 11.8 12.7 13.3 17.0 19.4  20.9  21.2
Trade balance (A-B)  -2.7 -2.4 -2.1 -2.3 -4.8 -6.4  -6.9  -7.7
    
Invisibles, net  2.1 3.1 3.4 4.6 4.5 5.2  5.8  6.2
of which     
 Software  Exports  1.2 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.4 2.8  3.2  3.2
 Current  Transfers  2.8 3.3 3.3 3.7 3.0 3.1  3.1  3.5
    
Current Account Balance  -0.6 0.7 1.3 2.3 -0.4 -1.2  -1.1  -1.5
Net Capital Inflows  1.9 1.8 2.1 2.8 4.0 3.1  5.0  9.2
of which     
 Foreign  Direct 
 Investment    0.7 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.5 0.4  0.9  1.3
 Foreign  Portfolio 
 Investment  0.6 0.4 0.2 1.9 1.3 1.5  0.8  2.5
 External  Assistance  0.1 0.2 -0.6 -0.5 0.3 0.2  0.2  0.2
 External  Commercial 
 Borrowing    0.9 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 0.7 0.3  1.8  1.9
 NRI  Deposits  0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 -0.1 0.3  0.5  0.0
  Short Term Trade 


















Memo Items    
Foreign Exchange 
Reserves 
(year end US $ billion)  42.3 54.1 76.1 113.0 141.5 151.6  199.2  309.7
Increase in Reserves  
(US $ billion)  4.3 11.8 22.0 36.9 28.6 10.1  47.6  110.5
Net Capital Inflows  
(US $ billion)  8.8 8.6 10.8 16.7 28.0 25.5  45.8  108.0
Non Oil Export Growth 
(%) 16.1 -2.3 20.2 20.2 27.0 19.5  17.8  24.5
Non Oil Import Growth 
(%)  -5.9 7.2 17.0 31.5 41.8 28.8 22.2 24.4
Services Export Growth 
(%) 3.6 5.4 21.1 29.4 61.0 33.3  32.1  15.1
Oil Imports ( US $ billion)  15.7 14.0 17.6 20.6 29.8 44.0 57.1 79.6
Exchange Rate (Rs/US $)  45.7 47.7 48.4 46.0 44.9 44.3  45.3  40.2
 
Sources: Reserve Bank of India: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy and Bulletins. 
 
First, the growth of service exports has been strong throughout the period, especially 
of IT software. Software exports increased more than six fold from $ 5.7 billion in 
2000/01 to $ 37 billion in 2007/8, raising their ratio to GDP from 1.2 percent to 3.2 
percent. Combined with continued buoyancy in current transfers (remittances from 
abroad), which generally remained above 3 percent of GDP throughout, the ratio of 
“net invisibles” to GDP tripled from 2.1 percent in 2000/01 to 6.2 percent in 2007/8. 
It was this robust growth in invisible earnings which took the current account balance 
into unfamiliar (for India) positive territory for three successive years, 2001/2-2003/4. 
After that, rapid growth of non-oil imports (sucked in by the investment-led growth 
spurt) and a steadily rising oil import bill took the current account back into deficit. 
This is the second noteworthy trend: between 2003/4 and 20007/8 India’s 
merchandise trade deficit to GDP ratio rose steeply from 2.3 percent to 7.7 percent. 
And this happened despite strong growth of exports, averaging over 20 percent a year 
in dollar terms. Indeed, the current account deficit ratio remained moderate thanks 
only to sustained increase in net invisibles, noted earlier.   
 
The third major development has been on the capital account of the balance of 
payments. From 2002/3 to 2007/8 India experienced a sustained and unprecedented 
surge in net foreign capital inflows, which soared tenfold from $ 10.8 billion in 
2002/3 to $ 108 billion in 2007/8. As a proportion of GDP the increase was from 2.1 
percent of GDP to 9.2 percent. The surge was particularly strong in the two years 
between 2005/6 and 2007/8, when net inflows jumped fourfold from $ 25 billion to $ 
108 billion. Since over the period 2002/3 to 2007/8 the current account was close to 
balance, the bulk of the net inflows went to swell the country’s foreign exchange 
reserves. These reserves rose from $ 76 billion in March 2003 to $ 310 billion in 
March 2008, with nearly $ 160 billion being added in the last two years. The main 
forms of capital inflow were foreign direct and portfolio investment and external 
commercial borrowing by Indian companies. The capital surge and the resultant 
reserves build-up posed major challenges and choices for the country’s   7
macroeconomic policies, especially in regard to the exchange rate, convertibility and 
monetary policies. These are discussed in section II below. 
 
D.  Domestic Balance: Deficits, Savings and Investment 
 
Growth, inflation and external balance are the main ultimate targets of 
macroeconomic policy. They are the outcome variables by which an economy’s 
macroeconomic performance is generally evaluated. There is also much interest in a 
set of intermediate target variables which are crucial for macroeconomic policies and 
outcomes. These are the fiscal balance, savings and investment. 
 
On a combined basis (central and state governments) India has been running large 
fiscal deficits for over 30 years. Until recently, in any given year, India’s fiscal deficit 
would typically figure among the top seven or eight countries in the world.
8 As Table 
6 and Figure 2 show, the combined fiscal deficit had climbed above 9 percent of GDP 
in the years preceding the 1991 economic crisis. Rising fiscal profligacy was 
generally seen as an important contributory factor to that crisis.
9 Concerted efforts by 
the central government brought the deficit down to a manageable 6.5 percent of GDP 
by the mid-1990s. This consolidation was reversed in the next five years because of 
the large public pay increases after 1996/7, low revenue buoyancy and weak 
expenditure control policies. By 2001/2 the fiscal deficit was nearly 10 percent of 
GDP, and the revenue deficit (approximately government dissavings) was at a record 
7 percent. 
 
Table 6:  Consolidated Deficits of Central and State Governments 
 








1988/89- 1990/91 (Average)  8.9  3.4  4.8 
1995/96- 1996/97 (Average)  6.5  3.4  1.4 
1998/99- 2000/01 (Average)  9.3  6.4  3.7 
2001/02  9.9 7.0 3.7 
2002/03  9.6 6.6 3.1 
2003/04  8.5 5.8 2.1 
2004/05  7.5 3.6 1.3 
2005/06  6.7 2.8 1.0 
2006/07  5.6 1.4 0.0 
2007/08 (RE)  5.3  0.9  -0.3 
 
Sources: Reserve Bank of India: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy and Annual 
Report, 2007/08. 
 
                                                 
8  For example, in 2000 India was clubbed with Ethiopia, Turkey and Zimbabwe for the top four slots 
(Acharya, 2002a). 
9  See, for example Ahluwalia (2002), Acharya (2002a) and Panagariya (2008).   8
Figure 2:  Combined Deficits of Central and State Governments 
 
 
A sustained effort at fiscal consolidation resumed after 2002/3 and brought the 
combined fiscal deficit down to 5 percent of GDP in 2007/8 and the revenue deficit to 
just one percent (discussed further in section II below). Large fiscal deficits tend to 
preempt loanable funds, foster high real interest rates and crowd out productive 
investment. Not coincidentally, periods of declining fiscal deficit have been 
associated with acceleration in economic growth (1992-97 and 2003-2008), while 
periods of rising deficits correlate with slowdowns (1997-2002 and, perhaps, 2008-
onwards). 
 
The last 6 years, 2002/3-2007/8, have witnessed a remarkable transformation in the 
level and composition of aggregate savings and investment in the economy (Table 7). 
First, the total investment rate hardly changed between the early 1990s and the first 
years of the current decade, holding steady at about 24 percent of GDP. In the next 
five years it rose steeply to 36 percent in 2006/7 (according to the government’s 
provisional estimates the level rose further to 37.5 percent in 2007/8).  Second, this 
unprecedented jump in the aggregate investment rate by 12 percent of GDP in five 
years was matched by an almost equal spurt in domestic savings from 23.6 percent of 
GDP in 2000-02 to 34.8 percent in 2006/7. Third, India has had very little recourse to 
net foreign savings (equivalent to the current account deficit on the balance of 
payments) throughout the entire period, especially in the present decade.  
   9
Table 7:  Savings and Investment 





















1.  Household  Savings  17.1 16.4 21.9 23.2 24.4 23.0 24.2 23.8   
2. Private Corporate   
        Savings  2.9 4.7 3.6 3.9 4.4 6.6 7.5 7.8  
3.  Public  Savings  2.2 2.4 -1.9  -0.6 1.1 2.2 2.6 3.2  
   (a) Government   
        Administration  -(1.5)  -(1.6)  -(5.8)  -(5.2) -(3.6)  -(2.6)  -(1.9)  -(1.3)   
   (b) Public  
         Enterprises  (3.7) (4.0) (3.9) (4.6) (4.7) (4.8) (4.5) (4.6)   
4. Gross Domestic  
    Savings  
    (1+2+3)  22.2  23.6  23.6  26.4  29.8  31.8  34.3  34.8   
5.  Net  Foreign  Savings  1.9 1.5 0.0 -1.2  -1.6 0.4 1.2 1.1  
6. Gross Domestic  
    Investment 




The composition of the massive rise in domestic savings is also quite novel for India. 
The category of “households” (including unincorporated enterprises) continues as the 
largest single component of domestic savings, with its share rising steadily as a ratio 
of GDP over the past two decades. But this category of savers only accounted for an 
additional 2 percent of GDP between 2000-02 and 2006/7. The remainder of the 11 
percent (of GDP) increase came from private companies and the public sector 
(government and enterprises). The contribution of private corporate savings 
(depreciation provisions and retained earnings) more than doubled from 3.6 percent of 
GDP in 2000-02 to 7.8 percent in 2006/7. This remarkable increase was propelled by 
the extraordinary growth in corporate earnings after 2003/4 and the surge in corporate 
investment from under 6 percent of GDP in 2000-02 to 14 percent in 2006/7. 
 
But the biggest contributor to the savings explosion after 2001/2 has been public 
savings, which went from minus 1.9 percent of GDP in 2000-02 to plus 3.2 percent in 
2006/7, a massive turnaround of 5.3 percent of GDP. As Table 7 shows, the bulk of 
this improvement occurred in government (at all levels), with only modest increases 
in the enterprise sub-sector. Basically, the turnabout was driven by reductions in 
revenue deficits of central and state governments during this period (for reasons 
elaborated in section II). In a nutshell, the huge 12 percent of GDP rise in the gross 
investment rate over the last six years was largely funded by unprecedented increases 
in corporate and government savings.  
 
E.  Macroeconomic Performance: an overview 
 
By 2007/8, sixteen years had passed since the external payments crisis of 1991/92 and 
the initial burst of economic reforms it triggered. It is instructive to look at how major 
macroeconomic indicators have evolved over this period. Table 8 presents the data for 
three successive sub-periods, with the first two corresponding neatly to the Eighth and 
Ninth Five Year Plans and the third period spanning the Tenth Plan plus the year   10
2007/8. The data reveal a striking fact: all the macroeconomic indicators show 
superior outcomes in 2002/3-2007/8 as compared to the earlier sub-periods, with the 
marginal exception of the combined fiscal deficit, which is very slightly higher in 
2002/3-2007/8 as compared to 1992/3-1996/7. Indeed if we shorten the latest sub-
period to five years by dropping 2002/3, then even this marginal qualification 
vanishes (see the last column in Table 8).  
 
Table 8:  Comparative Overview of Macro Indicators 
 









Economic Growth (% per year)  6.6  5.5  7.9  8.8 
Inflation (GDP deflator, % per year)  9.1  5.0  4.4  4.5 
Current Account Deficit (% of GDP)  1.1  0.6  0.1  0.4 
Combined Fiscal Deficit (% of GDP)  7.1  9.0  7.2  6.7 
Gross Domestic Investment (% of 
GDP) 
24.2 24.3  32.2 33.6 
 
Sources: Tables 1, 4, 5, 6, 7. 
 
In other words, the latest five-year period, 2003/4-2007/8 boasts the best average 
outcomes with regard to all the major macro indicators of economic growth, inflation, 
external balance, fiscal imbalance and aggregate investment, when compared to any 
other five-year period since 1991. Furthermore, this superiority in macroeconomic 
performance would hold up on all counts, even if we took such comparisons back to 
1980.  
 
Before we succumb to excessive complacency, it is important to note that the 
combination of a global slowdown, a world-wide commodity price shock (especially 
energy and food), stalled domestic economic reforms and fiscal laxity seem to have 
marked 2008 as the end of this “golden era”, with economic growth slowing, inflation 
soaring, the current account and fiscal deficits widening sharply and gross investment 
faltering. Put another way, the legacy of 2003/4-2007/8 is a set of very difficult 
macroeconomic challenges for the country. More on this in section III. 
 
II.   Major Challenges for Macroeconomic Policy 
 
The period 2001-08 began with massive fiscal deficits at central and state government 
levels and ended with an inflationary spurt induced by an unforeseen global 
commodity price shock. In between, there were other major challenges for macro 
policy, including a sustained surge in foreign capital inflows after 2002/3 and an 
unprecedented acceleration in overall economic growth. This section focuses on two 
of these major issues: fiscal consolidation and the external capital surge. 
   11
A.  Fiscal Consolidation 
 
By 2001/2, the combined fiscal and revenue deficits of the central and state 
governments had attained record levels of 9.9 percent and 7 percent of GDP, 
respectively. Growth had slowed and aggregate savings and investment ratios had 
dropped markedly from earlier peaks. Government dissavings had risen to an 
unprecedented 6 percent of GDP and dragged public savings down to minus 2 percent 
of GDP. The growing need for fiscal consolidation had become urgent. 
 
Fortunately, both central and state governments had grasped the gravity of the fiscal 
imbalance and begun to take effective action. As Table 9 shows, the centre’s fiscal 
deficit declined from 6.2 percent of GDP in 2001/2 to 3.1 percent in 2007/8, while the 
revenue deficit fell from 4.4 percent to 1.4 percent. Over the same period, the states’ 
fiscal deficit came down from 4.2 percent of GDP to 2.3 percent and the revenue 
deficit showed an even greater improvement from 2.6 percent of GDP to minus 0.5 
percent. Together, these changes brought about the marked improvements in the 
combined fiscal and revenue deficits noted earlier. It is a heartening fact that these 
crucial improvements in the fiscal position were overseen by two successive 
governments at the centre (the NDA government until May 2004 and the UPA 
government thereafter) and a wide variety (politically) of governments at the level of 
the different states. 
 
Table 9:  Deficits of Central and State 
(As Percentage of GDP at current market prices) 
 













2001/02 6.2  4.4    4.2  2.6    9.9  7.0 
2002/03 5.9  4.4    4.1  2.3    9.6  6.6 
2003/04 4.5  3.6    4.4  2.3    8.5  5.8 
2004/05 4.0  2.5    3.4  1.2    7.5  3.6 
2005/06 4.1  2.6    2.5  0.2    6.7  2.8 
2006/07 3.5  1.9    1.9  -0.6    5.6  1.4 
2007/08 (RE)  3.1  1.4    2.3  -0.5    5.3  0.9 
 
Sources: Reserve Bank of India: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy and Annual  
Report, 2007/08. 
  
The key policies that induced these favorable fiscal developments varied across the 
two levels of government. At the central level, the enactment of the Fiscal 
Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) law in 2003/4 capped several years 
of technocratic and political efforts and gave a significant stimulus to the cause of 
fiscal consolidation.
10 The FRBM Act targeted elimination of the centre’s revenue 
                                                 
10 The bill was passed by Parliament in 2003 and enacted by the new (UPA) government in July 2004.   12
deficit by 2008/9 and a reduction of the fiscal deficit to 3 percent of GDP. It also 
specified minimum improvements towards these targets each year. The fiscal deficit 
target had been had been pretty much achieved by 2007/8, with relatively modest 
recourse to creative accounting, such as incurring of off-budget liabilities. (The 
current year, 2008/9, will be a wholly different matter, thanks to huge implicit and 
explicit subsidies for fuel, fertilizers and food as well as the effects of the Sixth Pay 
Commission and the loan waiver for farmers announced in the 2008/9 budget). 
 
The second major policy initiative at the central level was a concerted and sustained 
programme to raise the tax- GDP ratio through better application of information 
technology and other means to strengthen tax administration.
11 Coupled with the 
remarkable acceleration in economic growth (especially of industry and services) after 
2002/3, this helped to lift the centre’s tax-GDP ratio (net of devolution to states) from 
5.9 percent of GDP in 2001/2 to 9.2 percent in 2007/8 (Table 10). About three-
quarters of this increase came from direct taxes, notably corporate and personal 
income taxes, whose share in total central government tax revenues rose to an 
unprecedented 50 percent in 2007/8 from 37 percent in 2001/2. Corporate taxes were 
exceptionally buoyant, with their share in central tax revenues increasing from below 
20 percent to above 30 percent over this period (Government of India, 2008a) 
 
Table 10:  Centre's Fiscal Position- A Summary Review 
 
(As percent of GDP at current market prices) 
 
















(1) Revenue Receipts  9.2  8.8  9.4  9.6  9.7  9.7  10.5  11.1 
(2) Tax Revenue (net 
to centre) 
6.5  5.9 6.5 6.8 7.1 7.5 8.5  9.2 
(3)  Non-tax  Revenue  2.7  3.0 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.2 2.0  2.0 
(4) Expenditure  15.6  15.9 16.8 17.1 15.8 14.2 14.1  15.1 
(5) Revenue 
Expenditure 
13.3 13.2 13.8 13.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 
(6) Capital 
Expenditure 
2.3  2.7 3.0 4.0 3.6 1.9 1.7  2.6 
(7) Revenue Balance 
(1-5) 
-4.1 -4.4 -4.4 -3.6 -2.5 -2.6 -1.9 -1.4 
(8) Fiscal Balance  -5.7  -6.2 -5.9 -4.5 -4.0 -4.1 -3.4  -3.1 
 
Sources: Economic Survey- various issues and Budget papers for 2008/09. 
 
                                                 
11 See Acharya (2006, chapter 5) and Chakravarty (2004).   13
Table 11:  State's Fiscal Position- A Summary Review 
 


















(1) Revenue Receipts  11.3 11.2 11.1 11.2 11.5 12.0 12.8  13.3 
(2) Tax Revenue  8.0 7.9 7.9 8.0 8.3 8.6 9.0  9.3 
(3) Non-tax Revenue  3.3 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.3 3.5 3.8  3.9 
(4) Expenditure  16.0 16.5 16.7 18.7 17.6 15.7 15.9  16.7 
(5) Revenue 
Expenditure 
12.6 13.8 13.5 13.5 12.8 12.2 12.2 12.9 
(6) Capital 
Expenditure 
3.4 2.7 3.2 5.2 4.8 3.5 3.7 3.8 
(7) Revenue Balance 
(1-5) 
-0.9 -2.6 -2.3 -2.3 -1.2 -0.2 0.6 0.5 
(8) Fiscal Balance  -3.3 -4.2 -4.1 -4.4 -3.4 -2.5 -1.9  -2.3 
 
Sources: Economic Survey- various issues and Annual Report 2007-08, RBI 
 
At the state level, the big improvements in fiscal consolidation occurred after 2003/4 
(Table 11). Four major factors were at work. First, the remarkable growth in central 
tax revenues, noted above, also benefited the states, which received about 30 percent 
of these revenues under the tax devolution formulae mandated by the Finance 
Commissions.
12 Second, following the recommendations of the Twelfth Finance 
Commission (TFC), the non-tax revenue receipts of the states were buoyed by larger 
transfers of devolution grants from the central government. The TFC 
recommendations on debt relief and debt write-offs also catalyzed the adoption of 
fiscal responsibility laws by nearly all the states, since these benefits were made 
conditional on enactment of such laws. Fourth, after a long and tortuous process of 
technical work and political negotiation, nearly three quarters of the states reformed 
their sales taxes to a set of broadly uniform state value-added-taxes in April 2005. 
Most of the remaining states followed in subsequent years. This helped boost the 
states’ own tax revenues significantly. 
 
These major achievements in fiscal consolidation up through 2007/8 have come under 
severe pressure in 2008 from mounting subsidies for petroleum products, fertilizer 
and food, the large public pay increases following the Sixth Pay Commission and the 
proliferation of populist schemes such as the loan waiver for small farmers. 
 
B.  Foreign Capital Surge 
 
Between 2002/3 and 2007/8 the level of net foreign capital inflows into India rose 
tenfold from $ 10.8 billion to $ 108 billion (Table 12). This unprecedented surge in 
external capital was both a cause and consequence of the country’s remarkable boom 
in investment and growth during the years 2003/4-2007/8. As RBI governor Reddy 
(2005) had presciently warned, this extraordinary spurt in capital inflows posed major 
                                                 
12 Effective 2004/5, the states’ share in central tax revenues was raised from 29.5 percent to 30.5 
percent.   14
challenges for management of the exchange rate, capital controls, monetary policy 
and inflation. 
 
Table 12:  Capital Inflows and Reserves 
($ billion) 
 
  2000/ 








1. Net Capital Inflows  8.8  8.6  10.8  16.7  28.0  25.5  45.8  108.0 
   of which (percent share) :                 
Foreign Direct 
Investment (37.0)  (55.4)  (29.7)  (14.3) (13.3)  (11.9) (18.5) (14.4) 
Foreign Portfolio 
Investment  (29.3) (22.8)  (8.7)  (67.9) (33.1) (49.1) (15.4) (27.1) 
External Commercial 
Borrowing (48.7)    (-18.5)    (-15.6)    (-17.5) (18.5) (9.8) (35.3) (20.5) 
       Non-Resident Deposits  (26.2)  (32.2) (27.5) (21.8)  -(3.4) (11.0) (9.4)  (0.2) 
       Other   (-41.2) (8.1)  (49.8) (13.6)  (38.5)  (18.2) (21.3) (37.8) 
               
2. Current Account 
 Balance  -2.7  3.4  6.3  14.1  -2.5  -9.9  -9.8  -17.4 
3. Increase in Foreign  
    Exchange  
    Reserves*         
4.3 11.8  22.0  36.9  28.6  10.1  47.6  110.5 
 
Sources: Reserve Bank of India: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy and Bulletins. 
* Differs from (1) + (2) because of errors and omissions and valuation changes. 
 
Confronted by rising capital inflows (at levels much higher than the current account 
deficit), the Reserve Bank (RBI) and government had the following basic options: 
  
•  allow the nominal (and real) exchange rate to appreciate;  
•  undertake unsterilized intervention, that is, maintain the nominal exchange   
rate through purchases of the surplus funds to augment reserves, with 
consequent increases in money supply and resultant inflationary pressures; 
•  conduct sterilized intervention, that is, forex purchases combined with 
compensatory sale of government securities by RBI to negate (or moderate) 
the increase in reserve money; 
•  loosen restrictions on outflows of capital; 
•  tighten restrictions on inflows of foreign capital; 
•  undertake some combination of the above policies. 
 
The usual textbook prescription, typically advocated by IMF interlocutors, favours 
exchange rate appreciation as the primary response. This recommendation draws 
strength from open economy macroeconomic theory and the associated “Impossible 
Trinity”, which disallows simultaneous achievement of exchange rate stability, 
monetary independence and capital market integration. Any two of these goals may 
be attained (at the vertices of the triangle in Figure 3), but never all three. What this 
theoretical insight tends to downplay is the fact that, with partial capital controls, 
countries in India’s situation can enjoy substantial monetary independence together 
with a fair degree of autonomy over the exchange rate level in an “managed float” 
system. Indeed, this is a hallmark of “intermediate” exchange rate regimes like those   15
prevailing in India and China.
13 India has followed a “managed float” since 1993, 
with fairly active intervention by the RBI to moderate market-driven volatility and 
maintain a “realistic” exchange rate. In practice, the latter has meant using the 
1993/94 value of the 6 (earlier 5) currency, trade-weighted real effective exchange 
rate (REER) index as a benchmark or informal guidepost (not a formal target). 
 
Figure 3:  The Impossible Trinity 
 
 
                                                     







     
 
 
                                             Increased capital 




                                       
Source:    Jeffrey Frankel, “No single currency regime is right for all countries at all times,” 
Princeton Essays in International Finance No.215, August 1999 
 
In a similar, though much shorter-lived, external capital surge in 1993-95 India’s 
policy-makers had resorted successfully to a combination of sterilized forex 
intervention and liberalization of the external payments regime.
14 This had checked 
the appreciation of the rupee and thereby nurtured a nascent export boom as well as 
preempting increased protectionist resistance to the ongoing programme of customs 
tariff reductions. This time too, the RBI and government opted for a similar strategy, 
although the task was substantially more challenging given the scale and longevity of 
this recent capital surge. Indeed, when the RBI ran out of government securities in 
2004, these had to be freshly issued under the new “Market Stabilization Scheme” 
(MSS), jointly established by the government and RBI in March 2004, to enable the 
RBI to continue with sterilization operations.
15 MSS operations were backed by the 
RBI’s short-term liquidity management through its Liquidity Adjustment Facility as 
well as occasional increases in the cash reserve ratio (CRR), especially in recent 
years.
16 Outflows of capital were also significantly liberalized during this period, 
                                                 
13 I prefer to classify “managed floaters” as belonging to the category of “intermediate” exchange rate 
regimes (intermediate between the two poles of full flexibility and a “hard peg”), in contrast to 
Fischer (2001), who puts them in the “floater” category.  
14 Acharya (2002b) provides a detailed account of this earlier episode. 
15 RBI (2004) provides details of the MSS system. 
16 For a detailed account of MSS operations and other measures deployed by the RBI to contain rupee 
appreciation see its Annual Reports over the period 2003-08. 
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encouraging a hefty increase in cross-border acquisitions by Indian companies. There 
was also a minor tightening of external commercial borrowing guidelines in 2007 and 
the prudential rules for participatory notes issued by foreign institutional investors. 
 
The success of this approach in containing nominal and real appreciation of the rupee 
during most of this capital surge may be gauged by the trajectory of the real effective 
exchange rate up until 2006/7 (Figure 4A). The rewards came in the form of sustained 
high growth of both merchandise and services exports (noted in section I), which were 
integral elements of the overall economic growth story during this period. Of course, 
the sterilization operations did entail growing fiscal and quasi-fiscal costs. But, as 
Bhalla (2008) and others have pointed out, such costs were far outweighed by the 
higher growth benefits of a competitive exchange rate policy. 
 
Figure 4A :  Annual 6- country NEER and REER indices  
(1993/94=100; Trade-based weights) 
 
 
Figure 4B:  Monthly 6- country index of REER 
(1993/94=100; Trade-based weights) 
 
 
Sources: Reserve Bank of India: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy and Bulletins. 
2007 2008 
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In spring 2007, as capital inflows rose steeply, the government and RBI seemed to 
falter in the pursuit of the chosen strategy, allowing a sharp appreciation of the rupee 
in March-May, 2007 (Figure 4B). However, as the spurt in capital inflows moderated 
in subsequent months, especially after the stock market declines of January 2008, this 
rupee appreciation was partially reversed and the earlier, long-established policy 
approach seemed to be resurrected. Incidentally, a significant part (over a quarter) of 
the massive spurt in capital inflows in 2006/7 and 2007/8 was in the form of external 
commercial borrowings, which were boosted by the premature loosening of 
borrowing guidelines by the government (Table 12). 
 
On balance, judging by the outcomes in terms of the exchange rate, strong trade 
expansion, low inflation, investment buoyancy and record economic growth, the RBI-
government strategy for managing the unprecedented capital surge appeared to have 
been remarkably successful. In hindsight, one significant weakness might have been 
the rapid increase in domestic liquidity over this period, since sterilization of capital 
inflows was only partial. This may have exacerbated the impact of the global 
commodity price shock which hit India in early 2008, resulting in a sharp acceleration 
in inflation from March onwards. However, it is doubtful whether politically feasible 
degrees of additional monetary tightening in 2004-07 would have made any 
significant difference to this inflationary upswing. As it is, the RBI sometimes found 
it an uphill task to secure government support for the steady tightening of monetary 
conditions (through increases in both policy rates and reserve requirements) that it 
carried out over 2004-07. 
 
III.  Key Issues for the Future 
 
We noted at the end of section I that 2008 has confronted India with serious 
macroeconomic challenges, with investment and economic growth slowing, inflation 
soaring and fiscal and current account deficits widening sharply. Some of these 
important problems (such as inflation) may abate somewhat as the global commodity 
price shock subsides and international credit and capital markets stabilize. Here my 
focus is on three key issues, which I anticipate will continue to pose challenges in the 
medium term: the task of restoring fiscal balance; the difficult choices in regard to 
currency convertibility and exchange rate management; and the role of the central 
bank, the RBI. 
 
A.  Restoring Fiscal Balance 
 
As we saw, by 2007/8, the combined fiscal deficit had fallen to 5.3 percent of GDP 
(the centre’s to 3.1 percent) and the combined revenue deficit to 0.9 percent of GDP 
(the centre’s to 1.4 percent), marking enormous progress in fiscal consolidation at 
both central and state government levels since the record deficits of 2001/2. However, 
this progress was a little exaggerated by the new trend of resorting to off-budget 
liabilities to fund growing subsidies for oil and fertilizers, where user prices were held 
down by government, despite steeply rising international prices. Thus, according to 
official accounts, in 2007/8, Rs. 20,333 crores of “oil bonds” were issued to the 
government-owned oil-marketing companies in lieu of subsidies to partially cover 
their losses stemming from controlled prices of petrol, diesel, LPG and kerosene 
(Reserve Bank, 2008). Similarly, Rs. 7,500 crores of “fertilizer bonds” were issued to 
the fertilizer companies to partially compensate their losses arising from controlled   18
issue prices of fertilizers. Together they amounted to Rs. 30,833 crores or 0.7 percent 
of GDP, not a trivial amount. 
 
 In effect, this practice understated the levels of the true revenue and fiscal deficits by 
this amount. As the RBI observes in its Annual Report for 2007/8, “ Although the 
issuance of such bonds does not directly increase the conventionally measured fiscal 
deficit, the proceeds from such bonds are used to effectively fund current subsidy 
expenditures. Their macroeconomic and financial market impacts, and crowding out 
of resource availability to the private sector are similar to expansion of the fiscal 
deficit” (Reserve Bank, 2008, p.25). 
 
With international prices of oil, fertilizer and food continuing to rise after March 2008 
and little adjustment in domestic user prices by government, the level of this “off-
budget deficit” has risen sharply in 2008, especially when one adds unbudgeted 
expenditure demands from the farm loan waiver scheme (announced by government 
in February 2008) and the government pay increases following the Sixth Pay 
Commission (notified in August, 2008). The Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory 
Council reported in end July 2008 that “total off budget liabilities of the Centre could 
exceed 5 percent of GDP, over and above the budgeted central fiscal deficit of 2.5 
percent” for 2008/9 (Government of India, 2008b).
17 Adding the states’ fiscal deficit, 
after making some allowance for pay commission triggered salary increases, it seems 
reasonable to expect a combined (true) fiscal deficit of 10 percent of GDP or higher 
for 2008/9.  
 
That would amount to a doubling, in a single year, of the combined fiscal deficit 
recorded in 2007/8 and could set a new record for the fiscal deficit in India. Since the 
overwhelming bulk of this increase is due to items on the revenue account, the 
combined (true) revenue deficit could soar fivefold to 5 or 6 percent of GDP, with an 
associated collapse in public savings. This is the enormity of the fiscal consolidation 
challenge faced by India’s policy makers in the latter half of 2008. It could be even 
worse if tax revenues drop below budget targets because of slowing economic growth, 
especially in industry. 
 
It is ironic that after the enormous success in fiscal consolidation achieved in 2002-
2008, the primary macroeconomic challenge confronting India for the medium-term is 
again one of restoring fiscal balance. In some ways the task ahead is harder because it 
may be unreasonable to expect the kind of revenue buoyancy experienced in recent 
years. Also, given the growing expenditure demands of recently launched populist 
schemes (such as the National Rural Employment Guarantee and the farm loan 
waiver) the prospects for expenditure compression may be limited. The two main 
feasible avenues for fiscal consolidation that will need to be pursued vigorously are 
upward adjustment (or decontrol) of controlled prices for fuel, food and fertilizers and 
large-scale sale of equity in government enterprises. However, both these options will 
face considerable political resistance in the likely scenarios of governance that may 
emerge in the 2009 general elections. 
                                                 
17 The report assumes an average price for oil of $ 130 per barrel. If the average oil price is lower, the 
scale of additional off-budget liabilities incurred in 2008/9 will be correspondingly reduced.   19
In other words, the formidable task of restoring fiscal balance is likely to take several 
years, during which interest rates may remain elevated and investment and growth 
somewhat subdued compared to the buoyant experience of 2003-08. 
 
B.  Convertibility and Exchange Rate Management 
 
The high tide of advocating rapid transition to full capital account convertibility 
(CAC) for emerging nations came in 1996-97, with the US Treasury and the IMF 
leading the charge and espousing enabling amendments of the IMF’s Articles of 
Agreement. The Asian financial crisis of 1997/98 and the Russian debt default of 
1998 provided hard knocks in the school of experience, which stalled the CAC 
evangelists. More recently, the astonishing rise of China and the recent spurt in 
India’s economic growth (both without the benefits of full CAC) have contributed to 
muting the earlier enthusiasm.  
 
The empirical literature has also supported agnosticism.
18 More interestingly, Kose, 
Prasad and Terrones (2008) find that FDI and portfolio equity investment boost 
productivity growth, while external debt is negatively correlated, especially in poorer 
countries. This is reassuringly consistent with India’s calibrated approach to CAC 
over the last fifteen years, steadily opening up to FDI flows and portfolio equity, 
while moving cautiously on debt flows, especially banking flows and short-term 
borrowing. Mainstream western economists now routinely stress the importance of 
prior conditions such as fiscal consolidation, low inflation, and a well regulated 
financial system, criteria which were stressed by the first Tarapore Report (Reserve 
Bank, 1997). Thus Eichengreen (2007) notes “it is more prudent that capital account 
liberalization wait on the prior implementation of other reforms to avoid precipitating 
a crisis.” 
 
It is all the more surprising to find trigger-happy recommendations in favour of a 
rapid move to CAC in the recent “expert committee” report on making Mumbai an 
International Financial Centre (Government of India, 2007). This report 
recommended achievement of full CAC within one year of its submission, that is, by 
spring 2008! Fortunately, the government and the RBI have paid little heed to this 
recommendation so far. In any case, the RBI has steadily liberalized capital account 
transactions, not only for foreign direct and portfolio investors but also for residents, 
especially companies. This has facilitated the massive increase in cross-border 
acquisitions by large and medium size Indian companies in recent years.  
 
Given the upsurge in inflation since spring 2008 and the steep increase in the fiscal 
deficit, noted above, it would be unwise to accelerate the pace of capital account 
liberalization in the foreseeable future, especially given the damage potential of 
volatile capital flows, real sector inflexibilities and the differential treatment of 
emerging countries by international financial markets (Reddy, 2008a). Of course, a 
cautious, iterative approach need not accept Williamson’s (2006) recommended thirty 
year horizon for CAC in India!  
 
Another important reason for a calibrated approach to CAC is the need to maintain 
some discretionary autonomy over the exchange rate for some years to come. The 
                                                 
18 See, for example, Prasad, Rogoff, Wei and Kose (2003).   20
RBI’s implementation of the “managed float” of the rupee since 1993 has served the 
country admirably, muting excess volatility while generally maintaining a competitive 
exchange rate. This policy has been the key determinant of rapid growth in exports of 
goods and services and has greatly facilitated India’s growing integration with the 
world economy (Bhalla, 2007, 2008). Any sudden (as in spring 2007) or sustained 
appreciation in the real effective exchange rate would be particularly damaging for the 
development of labour-intensive production (for both exports and domestic markets), 
which remains seriously handicapped by other major constraints, including rigid, anti-
employment labour laws, poor infrastructure and weak human resource development 
policies. In these respects the Indian situation is much worse than in China, which 
maintained a significantly under-valued exchange rate for many years to consciously 
(and successfully) promote explosive growth of labour-intensive exports, despite the 
build-up of huge current account surpluses (Eichengreen, 2007and Bhalla, 2007). Of 
course, a gradual upward drift in the real effective exchange may be warranted if 
India’s productivity increases outstrip those of her major partners and competitors in 
the years ahead. 
 
Such an eclectic approach to the choice of exchange rate regime and its management 
is also supported by recent reviews of experience and lessons of exchange rate 
regimes in emerging countries (Frankel, 2003). 
 
C.  Role of the Reserve Bank 
 
In recent years there has been vigorous debate on the appropriate role of the RBI in 
India’s future. At present, the RBI explicitly pursues multiple objectives of low 
inflation, sustainable economic growth and “orderly conditions in the foreign 
exchange market” (Reddy, 2000). It is also responsible for the regulation of banks and 
other deposit-taking institutions and has shouldered the objective of overall financial 
stability. Furthermore, the RBI acts as banker to the government and manages the 
government’s debt operations. This is quite a portfolio of objectives and 
responsibilities.
19 Some recent commentary has recommended that the RBI should 
focus on the single objective of low inflation and divest itself from its other objectives 
and responsibilities. For example, this is the first recommendation of the recent draft 
report of the Raghuram Rajan chaired “Committee on Financial Sector Reforms” or 
CFSR (Government of India, 2008c). 
 
Such a recommendation may reflect a 15-year trend in a number of developed 
countries (including Australia, New Zealand and UK) to restructure their central 
banks to focus on the single objective of price stability through appropriate monetary 
policy. It tends to accompany three other features: statutory independence of the 
central bank, a fully flexible exchange rate policy (a “clean” float) and a separate and 
single financial services regulator for banks and other financial intermediaries. For 
example, the UK adopted this model in 1997.
20 
 
                                                 
19 Reddy (2008b) provides an illuminating and authoritative recent account of the RBI’s objectives, 
responsibilities and dilemmas. 
20 Interestingly, the US Federal Reserve is charged with multiple objectives and clearly accorded 
enormous weight to the objectives of financial stability and sustaining economic activity in its 
actions throughout the recent, “sub-prime” triggered credit crisis.    21
While the CFSR recommendation may have some relevance for the long-run, it seems 
wholly inappropriate for present conditions in India for several reasons. First, for the 
RBI to divest itself of its other objectives and responsibilities raises the immediate 
question of who is to take them on? The CSFR report is not particularly educative on 
this. Second, in the present and foreseeable political economy of India, it is difficult to 
envisage the RBI being able to conduct its monetary policy without explicit 
consideration of the short term consequences for the level and growth of economic 
activity. Third, as I have argued above, if the present system of a “managed float” 
with partial capital controls is appropriate for India, it is obvious that only the RBI can 
discharge this responsibility. Fourth, financial stability is clearly a key 
macroeconomic objective, which cannot be wished away. Here too there is no other 
viable alternative to the RBI for pursuing this goal in the present stage of institutional 
development. That also means that the regulation and supervision of banks and near-
banks has to remain with RBI.
21  
 
An area where change may be warranted in the near term is the divestment of the 
responsibility for managing the government’s debt to some independent body. 
However, the issue is far from clear cut, since the new body could be subject to even 
more pressure from the issuer of debt, the government. The other major area requiring 
reform is the quality and content of the RBI’s regulation and supervision of banks but 
a discussion of this subject is beyond the scope of this paper.   
 
D.  Coping with International Uncertainty 
 
This is being written in the autumn of 2008 when the sub-prime-based international 
credit crisis has led to huge upheavals in the world of global finance, including the 
demise of stand-alone Wall Street investment banks, massive government and central 
bank support to banks, mortgage lenders  and other financial intermediaries in the 
United States and Europe, bankruptcy of some large financial institutions, government 
guarantees of bank deposits in many countries, unprecedented turmoil in inter-bank 
lending and a massive $ 700 billion bail-out plan in the US. The impact of the 
financial crisis on the real economy in these countries has begun, including falling 
output and investment and rising employment. The depth and duration of the 
recession is still unclear but the available signs don’t bode well. 
 
In this background, there are likely to be major challenges for macroeconomic 
management in India in both the short and medium term. In the short run, as global 
financial investors liquidate their assets under stress, there are (and will be) large 
outflows of portfolio capital from Indian markets, a slowdown in direct foreign 
investment inflows, and increasing scarcity of commercial loans from abroad. 
Already, the equity markets are down over 40 percent from their January 2008 peak, 
the nominal exchange rate has depreciated around 15 percent against the US dollar 
and there has been a sharp tightening of short-term liquidity. The RBI has responded 
with a “managed” (through reserves sales) downward flexible exchange rate policy 
combined with injections of liquidity through various channels. As long as present 
pressures last, these are the appropriate priorities for short-term management.  
                                                 
21 It is noteworthy that the UK system failed to deal effectively and swiftly with the stability issues 
raised by the Northern Rock episode in September, 2007, partly because of the 1997 separation of 
banking supervision functions from the Bank of England.   22
In the medium term, as the world economy inevitably slows and transmits a 
deflationary impulse to India over the next year or two (or longer), monetary policy 
(which had been tightened in the last four years) will need to be steadily loosened to 
cushion the negative impact on domestic investment and consumption. Exchange rate 
policy will need to be flexible and agile with, probably, a downward bias. Even then, 
the reduction in trade and external capital inflows is likely to reduce India’s growth to 
around 7 percent or so for a couple of years from the 9 percent plus average of the 
past three years. Whether this “growth recession” is greater (or less) or longer (or 
shorter) will depend mainly on the severity of the downturn in the major industrial 
economies and the quality of India’s policy response to the weakened international 
economic environment. Clearly, swifter fiscal consolidation and effective forward 
movement on long-pending reforms in infrastructure, agriculture, labour laws, 
banking, energy, education and retail trade could compensate for the unavoidable 
downdraft from the international economy. 
 
 
    23
References 
 
Acharya, Shankar (2002a): ‘Macroeconomic Management in the Nineties’, Economic 
and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXVII, No. 16 pp 1515-38. Reprinted in Acharya 
(2006). 
 
_____ (2002b): ‘Managing India’s External Economic Challenges in the 1990s’,  in 
M. S. Ahluwalia, Y.V. Reddy and S. S. Tarapore (eds), Macroeconomics and 
Monetary Policy, Oxford University Press, New Delhi. 
 
_____ (2006): Essays on Macroeconomic Policy and Growth in India, Oxford 
University Press, New Delhi. 
 
_____ (2007):  Can India grow without Bharat?, Academic Foundation, New Delhi. 
 
Ahluwalia, Montek S. (2002): ‘Economic Reforms in India since 1991: Has 
Gradualism Worked?’ Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 (3). 
 
Bhalla, Surjit S. (2007): “Second among Equals: The Middle Class Kingdoms of India 
and China”, book draft, May, available at www.oxusinvestments.com 
 
______(2008): “Economic Development and the Role of Currency Undervaluation”, 
Cato Journal, Vol.26, No.2, Spring/Summer. 
 
Bosworth, Barry, Susan Collins and Arvind Virmani (2007): ‘Sources of Growth in 
the        Indian Economy’, in S. Bery, B. Bosworth and A. Panagariya (eds), 
India Policy Forum 2006/7, NCAER/Brookings, Sage, New Delhi. 
 
Chakravarty, Shomit (2004): ‘Reform of Tax Administration in India - A Quiet 
Revolution’ in ADB India Economic Bulletin, October 2004, New Delhi. 
 
Eichengreen, Barry (2007): ‘The Cautious Case for Capital Flows’, paper presented  
at NIPFP-DEA Research Conference, December 4-5, New Delhi; available at 
www.nipfp.org.in/nipfp-dea-program/index.html. 
 
Fischer, Stanley (2001): ‘Exchange Rate Regimes: Is the Bipolar View Correct?’, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol 15  No.2, Spring. 
 
Frankel, Jeffrey (2003): ‘Experience of and Lessons from Exchange Rate Regimes in 
Emerging Economies’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working 
Paper 10032, Cambridge. 
 
Gordon, Jim, and Poonam Gupta (2004): ‘Understanding India’s Services 
Revolution’, IMF Working Paper WP/04/171, September. 
 
Government of India, (2007): Report of the High Powered Expert Committee on 
Making Mumbai an International Financial Centre, Ministry of Finance, New 
Delhi. 
 
_____ (2008a):  Economic Survey, 2007/08, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi.   24
 
_____ (2008b): Economic Outlook for 2008/09, Economic Advisory Council to the 
Prime Minister, New Delhi. 
 
_____ (2008c):  Draft Report of the Committee on Financial Sector Reforms (CFSR), 
Planning Commission, New Delhi. 
 
Kose, Ayan, Eswar Prasad and Marco Terrones (2008): ‘Does Openness to 
International Financial Flows Contribute to Productivity Growth?’, Journal of 
International Money and Finance (forthcoming). 
 
Panagariya, Arvind (2008): India: The Emerging Giant, Oxford University Press, 
New York. 
 
Prasad, Eswar, Kenneth Rogoff, Shang-Jin Wei and Ayan Kose (2003): ‘Effects of 
Financial Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence’, 
IMF Occasional Paper No. 220, Washington DC. 
 
Reddy, Y. Venugopal (2000): ‘Monetary Policy in India: Objectives, Instruments, 
Operating Procedures and  Dilemmas’, in Y. V. Reddy, Monetary and 
Financial Sector Reforms in India: A Central Banker’s Perspective, UBS 
Publishers’ Distributors Ltd. 
 
_____ (2005): ‘Indian Economy: Current Status and Selected Issues’, Reserve Bank 
of India Bulletin, February, Mumbai.  
 
_____ (2008a): ‘Management of the Capital Account in India: Some Perspectives’, 
Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, February, Mumbai. 
 
_____ (2008b): ‘The Indian Economy and the Reserve Bank of India: Random 
Thoughts’, Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, April, Mumbai. 
 
Reserve Bank of India (1997): Report of the Committee on Capital Account 
Convertibility, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai. 
 
_____ (2004): Press Release 2003-2004/1125, March 25, Reserve Bank of India, 
Mumbai.  
 
_____ (2008):    Annual Report 2007-08, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai. 
 
Williamson, John (2006): ‘Why Capital Account Convertibility in India is Premature’, 
Economic and Political Weekly, May 13, Mumbai.   25
 
 
LATEST ICRIER’S WORKING PAPERS 
 
NO.  TITLE 
 





AND INDIA’S GROWTH: THE 
ROLE OF FINANCIAL POLICIES 
 













CATHERINE YAP CO 
FANYING KONG 






















CHINA AND INDIA: A TALE OF 













TRADING WITH ASIA’S GIANTS  
 
BARRY BOSWORTH 
SUSAN M. COLLINS 




219  INFORMAL VALUES AND 
FORMAL POLICIES: A STUDY OF 
JAPANESE TECHNOLOGY 









INTEGRATION AND FDI IN 
SOUTH ASIA : PROSPECTS AND 
PROBLEMS 
 







DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY FOR 











IMPACT OF PROPOSED 
COMMODITY TRANSACTION 











INDEX OF FINANCIAL 
INCLUSION 
 




   26
About ICRIER 
 
ICRIER – established in August 1981 – is an autonomous, policy-oriented, 
not-for-profit research institute. We have nurtured our cherished autonomy by 
establishing an endowment fund, income from which enables us pursue our 
priority research agenda. ICRIER’s office is located in the prime institutional 
complex of India Habitat Centre, New Delhi. The focus of our work is to 
support India’s interface with the global economy.  
 
ICRIER’s founding Chairman was Dr. K.B. Lall who led the organization 
since its inception till 1992 when he handed over the Chairmanship to Mr. R.N. 
Malhotra (1992-1996). He was followed by Dr. I.G. Patel who remained 
Chairman from 1997 to 2005 until his demise in July 2005. ICRIER’s current 
Chairperson is Dr. Isher Judge Ahluwalia.  
 
Amongst ICRIER’s founding members are: Dr. Manmohan Singh, Dr. C. 
Rangarajan, Dr. M.S. Swaminathan, Dr. Jagdish Bhagwati, Dr. R. J. Chelliah, 
Mr. M. Dubey and Dr. Deepak Nayyar. 
 
ICRIER conducts thematic research in the following six thrust areas:  
 
•  Trade, Openness, Restructuring and Competitiveness  
•  WTO-Related Issues  
•  Regional and Bilateral Issues  
•  Financial Liberalization and Integration  
•  Macro-economic Management in an Open Economy  
•  Strategic Aspects of India’s External Relations  
 
To effectively disseminate the research findings, ICRIER organises 
workshops/ seminars/ conferences to bring together policy makers, 
academicians, Union Cabinet Ministers, Members of Parliament, senior 
industry representatives and media persons to try and create a more informed 
understanding on issues of major policy interest. ICRIER invites distinguished 
scholars and policy makers from around the world to deliver public lectures on 
economic themes of interest to contemporary India. 
 
ICRIER’s highly qualified in-house team of researchers includes several 
Ph.Ds from reputed Indian and foreign universities. At present the in-house 
team has 21 Senior Economists and 28 Research Associates/Assistants. In 
addition, ICRIER encourages external researchers to work on specific 
assignments and maintains a network of external consultants. At present we 
have 23 External Consultants working on various projects. The team is led by 
Dr. Rajiv Kumar, D.Phil in Economics from Oxford University and Ph.D 
from Lucknow University. 
 